We study the identification capacity of classicalquantum channels ("cq-channels"), under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we consider first compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper, considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then also the secrecy identification capacity is zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC), with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identification via channels was introduced by Ahlswede and Dueck [1] , forty years after Shannon [28] introduced information theory as a theory of communication. In Shannon's transmission theory the sender encodes the messages as sequences of channel input letters in such a way, that although if the channel might not transmit the sequence correctly, the receiver still can decide what message had been sent, at least with a high probability. In the theory of identification the receiver is not interested in the exact message. He only wants to know if the sent message is equal to a particular one that he is interested in. Of course, the sender does not know which message is interesting for the receiver. It was shown that there are codes for classical channels with double exponential size in the block length of the codewords. In identification theory, models are considered in which several receivers receive the same, but are interested in different messages. Applications for identification codes can be found in the theory of digital watermarks and communication complexity. We refer the reader to [29] for more details on quantum and classical channels, and the various transmission capacities associated with them, including their history. Löber [24] was the first to consider identification via classical-quantum channels (so-called cqchannels). We consider both secure and robust models of cq-channels. The security is modelled by a channel with an eavesdropper, called a wiretap cqq-channel. It is connecting a sender with two receivers, one legal and one wiretapper. The legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel. A code for the channel conveys information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper knows nothing about the transmitted information. The classical degraded form of this channel was introduced in [32] , who determined the secrecy capacity of this channel. The classical non-degraded model was presented and solved in [16] . The wiretap cqq-channel was considered in [15] and in [17] . To model the robustness aspect, we consider compound cq-channels, which are described as a set of memoryless channels. Before the start of the transmission, a channel is chosen unknown to the sender or receiver and used during the transmission of one codeword. The code of the sender and the receiver has to be robust and therefore independent of the chosen model. The classical channel model was introduced in [6] . The compound cq-channel was considered in [4] , [25] , [20] , and [14] . There exist many combinations of these concepts. The classical compound wiretap channel was considered in [23] and [5] . The transmission capacity of the compound wiretap cqq-channel was given in [7] . An overview on the topic identification can be found in [30] . In [11] we gave the identification capacities for the classical compound channel and the classical compound wiretap channel and in [13] we gave the same analysis for the classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel. Our result is a generalization to the classicalquantum case. We make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case. All proofs and mathematically complete explanations can be found in [12] .
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS

Definition 2.1:
A discrete classical-quantum channel (cqchannel) is a map W : X −→ S(B) where X is a finite set and S(B) the set of quantum states of the complex Hilbert space B, which we assume to be finite dimensional. We identify the states on B, S(B), with the set of density operators, i.e. the selfadjoint, positive semi-definite, linear operators on B with unit trace: S(B) = {ρ : ρ = ρ * ≥ 0, tr ρ = 1}, where tr ρ = i i|ρ|i for some complete orthonormal basis {|i } i . Associated to W is the channel map on a sequence of length n over the alphabet X , W ⊗n : X n −→ S(B ⊗n ) with W (x n ) = W ⊗n (x n ) = W (x 1 ) ⊗ · · · ⊗ W (x n ). (Note that to abbreviate, we will customarily omit the superscript ⊗n if the block length is evident from the input string x n .) We call W ⊗n a memoryless channel. In the following we use the notation P W ⊗n x n ∈X n P (x n )W (x n ) to denote the output state of the channel in S(B ⊗n ) when the input is distributed according to P . To access the (classical) information of a quantum state we have to perform a measurement on the output space. 
The largest M such that an (n, M, λ) code exist is denoted M (n, λ). The rate R of a (n, M, λ) code is defined as R = log M n . A rate R is said to be achievable if for all λ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a n 0 (λ), such that for all n ≥ n 0 (λ) there exists a (n, 2 nR , λ) code. The transmission capacity C(W) of a compound cq-channel W is the supremum of all achievable rates. Let ρ ∈ S(A) be a state of a quantum system A. We denote by S(ρ A ) = S(A) = − tr ρ A log ρ A the von Neumann entropy. We define the Holevo information I(X : B) = I(P ; W ) = S(P W ) − S(W |P ), with the output state P W = x∈X P (x)W (x) ∈ S(B), and S(W |P ) = x∈X P (x)S(W (x)) the conditional entropy of the channel output for the input distribution P . In identification theory we change the goal for Bob. We assume that he "only" wants to know if the transmitted message is equal to m. 
The largest size of an (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 ) ID-code is denoted N (n, λ 1 , λ 2 ). The ID-code for a quantum channel has the property that the received state cannot be used in general to ask for two different messages. The reason is that the POVMs (D i , 1−D i ) are in general not compatible. Therefore the realization of applications with more than one receiver like in the example above is not possible with an ID-code as defined. There are, however, applications where we have only two parties, which want to check if they have the same text (watermarking). Löber defined simultaneous ID-codes to overcome this limitation. In this code model, there has to be one single measurement which allows to identify every message at the same time.
Definition 2.5:
The largest size of a simultaneous (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 ) ID-code is denoted N sim (n, λ 1 , λ 2 ). In this case the measurement gives as a result some y ∈ Y, and receiver i has to check whether y ∈ A i . Note that the definition can be expressed equivalently as saying that the measurements (D i , 1 − D i ) are all compatible, because this requires that there exists a common refinement of them, i.e. a POVM of which all (D i , 1 − D i ) are coarse grainings.
One of the main topics in quantum information theory is to determine the transmission capacities. This quantity is defined as the maximum rate of asymptotical faithful transmission of classical bits over a (quantum) channel.
Theorem 2.6 ( [22] , [27] ): The classical transmission capacity of the cq-channel W , defined as C(W ) = inf λ>0 lim inf n→∞ 1 n log M (n, λ), is given by
We consider the identification capacity of a cq-channel, of which we distinguish a priori simultaneous and nonsimultaneous flavors:
Definition 2.7: The (simultaneous) classical ID-capacity of a cq-channel W is defined as, respectively,
Löber [24] showed that for cq-channels, the classical simultaneous identification capacity is equal to the transmission capacity. He showed that the strong converse holds for simultaneous ID-codes. Ahlswede and Winter [2] extended the strong converse also to non-simultaneous ID-codes.
III. IDENTIFICATION CAPACITY OF COMPOUND
CLASSICAL-QUANTUM CHANNELS
In [25] , [20] , and [14] the transmission capacity was derived. We use the transmission code and build an identification code with the method introduced in [1] . This method was also used in [24] for a cq-channel.
Definition 3.1: Let Θ be an index set, X a finite set and B a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Let W t : X −→ S(B) be a cq-channel for every t ∈ Θ:
The memoryless extension of the cq-channel W t is given by
The capacity C(W) of is defined as before.
Thus an (n, M, λ)-code for the compound channel W ensures that the maximal error probability for all channels W t is uniformly bounded above by λ. A more intuitive description of the compound channel is that the sender and receiver do not know which channel from the set W is actually used during the transmission of the n-block; their prior knowledge is merely that the channel is memoryless and belongs to the set W. Their task is to prepare for the worst case among those. 
The largest size of an (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 ) ID-code is denoted N (n, λ 1 , λ 2 ). Analogous to previous definitions we have also simultaneous ID-codes and the maximum code size N sim (n, λ 1 , λ 2 ). The identification capacities are defined as before.
Theorem 3.5 ( [12] ): Let W be an arbitrary compound cqchannel with finite input alphabet X and finite-dimensional output Hilbert space B. Then,
IV. THE WIRETAP CQQ CHANNEL An important aspect in information theory is security, or privacy. We restrict ourselves to the cq-channel case, where Alice's input is described by a letter x ∈ X . 
Note that by the Fannes inequality [18] , [31] , the second condition ("privacy") implies that for any random variable J taking values in [M ], I(J : E n ) ≤ µn log |E| + h(µ). It turns out that the right hand side can be made arbitrarily small while achieving the capacity, because µ, as well as λ, can be made to converge to 0 to any polynomial order. The largest M such that an (n, M, λ, µ)-wiretap code exists is denoted M (n, λ, µ). The secrecy capacity (aka private capacity) of (W, V ) is then defined as
lim inf n→∞ 1 n log M (n, λ, µ).
Theorem 4.3 ([15]):
The secrecy capacity of a wiretap cqqchannel is given by:
where the maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationships U → X n → B n E n .
V. SECURE IDENTIFICATION CAPACITY
OF WIRETAP CQQ-CHANNELS Definition 5.1: An (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ) wiretap ID-code for the wiretap cqq-channel (W, V ) is a set of pairs {(P i , D i ) : i ∈ [N ]} where the P i are probability distributions on X n and
If the POVMs (D i , 1 − D i ) are all compatible we call the code simultaneous, as in the cq-channel case. Condition (6) enforces that the wiretapper cannot distinguish very well the output states Q i V ⊗n of the different messages. Indeed, it is equivalent to
which by Helstrom's theorem [21] , [26] means that even if Eve knows somehow that the message can only be either i or j, with equal probability, then her error probability for discriminating these two alternatives is at least
The maximum N for which a (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ) wiretap ID-code exists is denoted by N (n, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ). For simultaneous wiretap ID-codes we denote the maximum N sim (n, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ) We then define the (simultaneous) secure identification capacity of the wiretap channel as respectively. We consider the wiretap cqq-channel and derive a multi-letter formula for its secure identification capacity. The idea is similar to the classical case. We use a combination of two codes. For the converse we generalize inequalities of [3] and [19] . Theorem 5.2 (Dichotomy [12] ): Let C(W ) be the capacity of the cq-channel W and let C S (W, V ) be the secrecy capacity of the wiretap cqq-channel. Then,
VI. IDENTIFICATION CAPACITY OF COMPOUND WIRETAP
CQQ-CHANNELS
We consider a robust and secure classical-quantum channel. Definition 6.1: Let Θ and Σ be a index sets and let W = {W t : X → S(B) : t ∈ Θ} and V = {V s : X → S(E) : s ∈ Σ} be compound cq-channels. We call the pair (W, V) a compound wiretap cqq-channel. The channel output of W is available to the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the channel output of V is available to the wiretapper (Eve). We may sometimes write the channel as a family of pairs (W, V) = (W t , V s ) t∈Θ,s∈Σ . Definition 6.2: An (n, M, λ) transmission code for the compound wiretap cqq-channel (W t , V s ) t∈Θ,s∈Σ consists of a family C = (P i , D i ) i∈ [M ] where the P i are probability distributions on X n and, and (
The capacity is defined as before.
where B t are the resulting random quantum states at the output of legal receiver channels and E s are the resulting random quantum states at the output of wiretap channel. Definition 6.4: An (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ) wiretap ID-code for the compound wiretap cqq-channel (W, V) is a set of pairs
We define N (n, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ) as the largest N satisfying the above definition for a given n and set λ 1 , λ 2 , µ of errors. Definition 6.5: The identification capacity C SID (W, V) of a compound wiretap cqq-channel (W, V) is defined as
lim inf n→∞ 1 n log log N (n, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ).
Again we show a dichotomy result. Theorem 6.6 (Dichotomy [12] ): Let (W, V) be a compound wiretap cqq-channel. Then,
VII. ARBITRARILY VARYING WIRETAP CQQ-CHANNELS Definition 7.1: Let W t be a cq-channel for every t ∈ Θ: W t : x → W t (x). The memoryless extension of the cq-channel W t n is given by W t n (x n ) = W t1 (x 1 ) ⊗ . . . ⊗ W tn (x n ) for x n ∈ X n . We call W {W t } t∈Θ a arbitrarily varying cqchannel (cq-AVC). This is a generalization of Definition 3.1. In this case the jammer can change the channel during the transmission.
Theorem 7.2 (Dichotomy [12] ): Let C(W) be the capacity of the arbitrarily varying cq-channel W and let C S (W, V) be the secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical quantum wiretap channel (W, V). Then,
VIII. CONTINUITY AND SUPER-ADDITIVITY
In [11] we discussed the continuity and super-additivity for the identification capacity of a classical compound channel and a classical compound wiretap channel. It turns out that the results for the capacity of the classical-quantum case are completely analogous. We discuss the continuity and superadditivity for the identification capacity. In [11] and [13] we analyzed the identification capacity for the classical versions of the channels. In [9] and [10] the transmission capacity of classical channels is analyzed. We ask if C ID and C SID satisfy additivity for the above-mentioned channels. We analyze if the capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters. We study what happens if there are small variations in the uncertainty set. Obviously, it is desirable to have a continuous behavior of the capacity, meaning that small variations in the uncertainty set should only lead to small variations in the corresponding capacity. We also consider parallel (i.e. tensor product) channels, which means that they map pair of inputs independently to a tensor product of the output systems: define W ⊗ W as the set of channels W t1 ⊗ W t2 :
We say that the capacity C is super-additive if we can find two channels (W, V ) and ( W , V ) such that
We characterize the discontinuity points of C SID completely. We also show that the set of discontinuity points is never empty. We show that the ID-capacity of the compound cqchannel is additive and therefore not super-additive. It follows by its operational definition that for the message transmission capacity and for the message transmission secrecy capacity inequality (13) holds for "greater or equal". We show in [12] that the same also holds for the secure identification capacity. We characterize the super-additivity of compound cq-channels with and eavesdropper. Theorem 8.3 ([12] ): Let (W, V) and ( W, V) be two compound cq-channels with an eavesdropper, then we have superactivation for C SID iff we have super-activation for C S . The analysis of the transmission capacities of the cq-AVC with and without wiretap-channel have been performed in [8] and [9] . For the analysis we need the random coding capacity. This is the capacity if sender and receiver have access to the outcome of a random experiment. The exact definition of C S,ran is given in [8] . We show that the transmission random coding capacity of the cq-AVC is continuous. Now we analyze the continuity of C SID for cq-AVCs with an eavesdropper. We showed that C SID (W, V) = C sim SID (W, V) = C(W) if C S (W, V) > 0 and = 0 otherwise. We use this representation to fully characterize the continuity behavior and the discontinuity behavior of C SID . We fully characterize the occurrence of super-activation and super-additivity for C SID . Super-activation is the most powerful form of super-additivity, in this case two channels with capacity zero add up to one with positive capacity. An important feature of cq-AVCs is the symmetrizablility of the channels (see [12] ). We characterize this property in [12] by the function F. This is 0 iff the channels are symmetrizable.
Theorem 8.4 ( [12] ): Let (W 1 , V 1 ), (W 2 , V 2 ) be two cq-AVWCs. Then, 1) If max{C S,ran (W 1 , V 1 ), C S,ran (W 2 , V 2 )} > 0, then C SID shows super-activation for these two channels precisely when min{C S,ran (W 1 , V 1 ), C S,ran (W 2 , V 2 )} = 0, and C S,ran (W i , V i ) > 0 for an index i ∈ {1, 2}, w.l.o.g. i = 1. Therefore, necessarily C S,ran (W 2 , V 2 ) = 0, and F (W 1 ) = F (W 2 ) = 0. 2) If C S,ran (W 1 , V 1 ) = C S,ran (W 2 , V 2 ) = 0, then C SID can be super-activated iff F (W 1 ⊗ W 2 ) > 0. Theorem 8.5 ([12] ): Let (W 1 , V 1 ) and (W 2 , V 2 ) be two finite cq-AVWCs for which no super-activation occurs. Then, for these two channels, super-additivity of C SID holds iff C SID (W 1 , V 1 ) > 0 and C S (W 2 , V 2 ) = 0 but C ran (W 2 ) > 0, or vice versa with 1 and 2 interchanged. We have defined and analysed the identification capacities of wiretap and compound cq-channels, generalizing the notions and results of [11] . There, we have also given applications for using ID-codes in the secure and robust setting; these applications evidently extend to cq-channels. Let us however highlight the differences to the classical case: On the one hand, we only have multi-letter capacity formulas in the quantum case for all the secrecy results, such as Theorem 8.5, whereas for classical channel they are single-letter formulas. More importantly, the identification via quantum channels has two variants, simultaneous and non-simultaneous ID-codes. The converses for the latter are considerably more difficult; this is illustrated by the fact that while in the classical and simultaneous case they can be obtained by general information spectrum and resolvability methods, the converses and dichotomy theorems of the cq-versions require genuine quantum generalizations of resolvability ideas, in the case of the compound channel specifically adapted to the channel model. The focus of our work was to calculate the secure identification capacity with a jammer. Our general characterization was fundamentally important for the analysis of continuity behavior and in the analysis of the super additivity. The formula also allows us to analyze the influence of an attackers jamming strategies. One can fully characterize when the jammer is able to prevent reliable communication from the transmitter to the receiver.
